I spent two days at HumanX 2026 in San Francisco covering 27 sessions across AI infrastructure, enterprise adoption, agentic systems, security, creative, retail, and finance.

I heard about AI in marketing. AI in brand strategy. AI in customer service. AI in software development. AI in creative production. AI in financial infrastructure. AI in cybersecurity. AI in retail design. AI in financial crime. AI in compliance.

I did not hear a single session about the supply chain.

Not one.

For someone who came up through operations and supply chain, who has personally sat with demand forecasting spreadsheets that were wrong more often than right, navigated supplier disruptions without early warning, and made inventory decisions that were really just educated guesses dressed up in numbers. For an industry that sits at the core of the global economy, the silence was striking.

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What we mean when we say “supply chain.”

To be precise, this is not about last-mile logistics or route optimization—the areas that do get occasional attention. The Supply Chain word gets used loosely, usually.

This is about upstream decision-making: demand forecasting, supplier risk management, inventory positioning, and procurement intelligence.

Demand forecasting: predicting what you’ll need to sell or produce before you’ve sold or produced it.

Supplier risk management: identifying which suppliers are fragile before they fail you.

Inventory positioning: deciding how much of what to hold where, across a network that doesn’t sit still.

Procurement intelligence: understanding pricing patterns, lead time trends, and supplier behaviour across hundreds of relationships simultaneously.

These are decisions that get made every week in every company that makes or moves physical goods. They are made by people working with incomplete information, under time pressure, using tools that were not designed for the complexity of the problem. And they are decisions where being systematically better — not perfect, just better — compounds into enormous financial advantage over time.

Yet at a conference dedicated to AI’s transformation of business, they were absent. AI should be solving the industry’s problem right now.

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What I did hear

Here is what I did hear, to be fair.

P&G’s CIO Seth Cohen spent time on supply chain automation — specifically, unattended manufacturing scaled across nine locations, and molecular discovery work that cut development timelines from years to months. For a company like P&G’s scale, those results are genuinely significant. But they are the results of a decade-long data infrastructure investment that most companies, including most large companies, have not made.

Walmart’s Daniel Danker gave one supply chain example: a remote Canadian store used an internal tool called Code Puppy to combine weather data and ferry schedules for inventory planning. It’s a good story — a frontline associate solving a local operations problem with a tool headquarters gave them. But it’s a point solution, not a framework, and it was mentioned in passing in a session primarily about AI democratization.

That was essentially it. Two examples, mentioned briefly, in sessions about something else. For an industry representing somewhere between $15 and $20 trillion in global economic activity, that’s a remarkably thin presence.

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Why the supply chain is the most AI-ready industry nobody is talking about

What makes this gap surprising is that the supply chain is, on paper, one of the most AI-ready industries in existence.

It runs on data. Sensor data, transaction data, demand signals, supplier data, logistics data, and financial data. The data infrastructure in large supply chains is often more mature than in the marketing and creative functions that dominated the HumanX agenda.

The problems are structured. Unlike brand strategy or creative judgment, supply chain decisions are historically modelled, mathematically defined, and directly measurable. A demand forecast is either accurate or it isn’t. A stockout either happened or it didn’t. An inventory position either matched demand, or it left cash sitting on a shelf or a gap in a customer’s order. The feedback loops are tight, and the outcomes are concrete.

The stakes are direct. Having spent time inside these decisions, I can tell you that even small improvements in forecast accuracy at a meaningful scale translate into real money — in working capital, in margin, in customer retention. A 2% improvement in forecast accuracy at a company running substantial inventory isn’t a rounding error. It’s a financial event.

So why wasn’t it on stage?

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Three reasons for the gap

The first is audience composition. HumanX skews toward technology leaders, marketing executives, founders, and investors. Supply chain and operations leadership tends not to show up at general AI conferences. They attend industry-specific events — operational forums, ERP user conferences, sector trade shows. The gap in the room creates a gap in the agenda.

The second is vendor invisibility. The companies building AI for demand sensing, supplier risk, and logistics optimization are largely invisible outside their industry. They’re specialized, often enterprise-only, and they sell through procurement channels rather than developer communities. They don’t generate the kind of press coverage that gets sessions programmed at a conference like HumanX.

The third — and this is the one that matters most — is that the enterprise supply chain is genuinely hard to disrupt quickly. The data is siloed across ERP systems, warehouse management platforms, and procurement tools built over decades. Integration alone is a multi-year project. The risk tolerance for AI-driven decisions in the supply chain is low because the consequences of errors are operational and financial. You can course-correct a bad marketing campaign. You cannot easily recover from a production halt caused by a procurement decision that an AI made without the right context.

This is exactly why AI hasn’t disrupted the supply chain at the pace it’s disrupted other functions. And it’s exactly why, when it does, the value creation will be disproportionately large.

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What the conference did tell me

The sessions I attended gave me frameworks that apply directly to this gap, even though none of them were about the supply chain.

Databricks CEO Ali Ghodsi said something that stayed with me: current models are sufficiently capable, but they fail in enterprises because they lack context. The bottleneck isn’t the AI. It’s the organizational and data infrastructure around it. He expects enterprise AI adoption to take five to ten years.

That timeline maps almost exactly to where supply chain AI is in its adoption curve. The context problem is especially acute here. A demand forecasting model trained on historical sales data without context about upcoming promotions, competitor pricing moves, macroeconomic shifts, or supplier lead time changes will produce outputs that experienced planners will correctly distrust — because they know what the model doesn’t know. The data exists. The integration and context layer doesn’t.

The building of a trustworthy agentic AI session reinforced this from a different angle. Panellists from Dataiku made a distinction that matters enormously for supply chain: back-office decision agents — the ones affecting clinical outcomes, credit decisions, or supply choices — require far stronger testing and explainability than personal productivity tools. A demand forecasting agent that informs procurement isn’t a chatbot. It needs to be auditable, explainable, and designed to fail gracefully. Most current AI deployments are not built to that standard.

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What finance figured out that supply chain hasn’t yet

What I found most instructive at HumanX wasn’t what was said about supply chain. It was watching what happened to industries that got forced into AI governance before they were ready — and what that forced them to build.

The finance sessions were the clearest example. Multiple panels addressed AI compliance frameworks in regulated financial services — what one session called the “compliance flywheel.” The argument was that embedding compliance, risk, and governance early in AI product development actually accelerates innovation rather than slowing it. Shared semantic definitions, data lineage, and auditability become infrastructure that compounds over time. Organizations that treat compliance as an early-stage design constraint end up with more durable systems than those that bolt it on later.

The financial crime session added a sharper edge to this. Jonathan Levin of Chainalysis described how generative AI has dramatically lowered the barrier to entry for financial fraud — enabling impersonation, automation, and scale that wasn’t previously possible for lower-skill actors. The response from defenders has been to build proactive threat-hunting systems, intelligence-sharing networks, and AI agents that can process evidence and flag suspicious patterns faster than any human analyst.

I kept thinking about procurement fraud while sitting in those sessions. Supplier impersonation. Fake invoices. Bid manipulation. Ghost vendors. These are supply chain problems that have existed for decades and are about to get significantly harder to detect as AI makes fraudulent activity more convincing and more automated. The financial services industry is building defensive infrastructure right now because regulation and litigation forced the conversation. Supply chain hasn’t been forced there yet. But the same pressures — fraud escalation, operational failure, regulatory scrutiny, and eventually litigation — are coming.

The compliance frameworks being built in regulated finance are the template for what supply chain AI governance will eventually need to look like. The difference is in the timeline. Finance is building it now under pressure. Supply chain will build it later, under more pressure, starting from further behind.

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The investment angle

The publicly traded companies most exposed to the supply chain AI wave are not the model providers. They are the enterprise software platforms that own the data: the ERPs, the warehouse management systems, the supply chain visibility platforms, the procurement analytics tools. Every one of those companies is currently navigating the same question: do they build AI natively into their platforms, partner with AI providers, or get disrupted from below by AI-native startups that don’t carry decades of integration debt?

That question is not answered. The window where it remains unanswered is the window where the investment opportunity is most interesting — both in the incumbents navigating the transition and in the new entrants who might make the integration question irrelevant.

I track this closely because I sit at the intersection of it. I understand the operational problem from having lived inside it. I understand the AI capability layer from building tools on top of it. Those two lenses together are what make the gap visible.

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I came back from HumanX with a lot of material about where AI is moving and what serious operators and investors think. Most of it confirmed what I already believed about infrastructure, reliability, and the gap between demo performance and production reality.

The most valuable thing I came back with was silence.

Nobody talked about the supply chain. Not because it isn’t ready. Not because the problem isn’t large enough. Because the people who understand the problem and the people building the tools are not yet in the same room.

Finance got there first because it was forced. Supply chain will get there when it is forced to.

The question worth asking now — before the forcing event — is which companies are building the governance, the data infrastructure, and the AI capability to be ready when that moment arrives. Because the ones who are will look obvious in hindsight. They always do.

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Jinlu Wang has a background in supply chain, ERP implementation, and enterprise operations. She now builds automated trading systems and web applications and covers AI infrastructure, fintech, and enterprise technology for Trade with Harp, a paid investment research and trading community.

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At a time when global trade is fragmenting into blocs and alliances are strained by protectionism, Ottawa has chosen pragmatism over orthodoxy. By agreeing to sharply reduce tariffs on Chinese EVs in exchange for relief on Canadian agricultural exports — especially canola — Canada has signalled that economic survival sometimes demands uncomfortable choices. But Canada’s recent decision to strike an electric-vehicle (EV) trade arrangement with China,  has consequences that stretch far beyond trade balances as it will  also impact provincial politics, relations with Washington, and the future of Canada’s industrial identity.

Canada’s agriculture sector has long been collateral damage in diplomatic standoffs with China. Canola farmers have endured years of restricted access to one of their largest markets. The reopening of that door was not merely symbolic; it was existential. For Ottawa, continuing to absorb agricultural losses in the name of geopolitical alignment was becoming politically unsustainable.

The EV concession, therefore, is not ideological. It is transactional. Canada lowered its guard on Chinese EV — within limits and quotas — to secure immediate economic relief for a sector that had run out of patience. In doing so, it acknowledged a reality that policymakers often avoid admitting: moral posturing is easier when it does not come at a direct economic cost.

At the federal level, the deal has been framed as balance — diversification without capitulation. Officials argue that Canada cannot afford to tie its economic future entirely to the United States, particularly as American trade policy grows more inward-looking and unpredictable. In this reading, engaging China selectively is not betrayal but insurance.

No province has reacted more sharply than Ontario, where the automotive industry remains both an economic pillar and a political touchstone. Unionized labor forms a tightly woven ecosystem that depends heavily on access to the U.S. market and protection from unfair competition.

Ontario’s leadership fears that even a controlled inflow of low-cost Chinese EVs could destabilise this ecosystem. The concern is not volume alone, but precedent. Once the door is opened — even slightly — it becomes harder to argue for its closure later. Provincial leaders worry that domestic manufacturers, already under pressure from rising costs and technological transition, may find themselves competing with state-subsidised giants operating on an entirely different scale.

Behind the rhetoric lies a deeper anxiety  that Canada’s long-promised EV manufacturing renaissance may never materialise if the market is flooded too early with cheaper imports. For provinces that have invested political capital and public money in courting battery plants and auto investments, the deal feels like a gamble taken without their consent.

No analysis of Canadian trade policy is complete without considering the United States.   Supply chains cross borders seamlessly, particularly in the automotive sector, where vehicles and components may cross the frontier multiple times before completion.

Washington’s discomfort with Canada’s EV deal is therefore unsurprising. The United States has taken a hard line against Chinese electric vehicles, viewing them not only as economic competitors but as strategic instruments of state policy. From Washington’s perspective, a softer Canadian stance risks creating loopholes — real or perceived — in North America’s defensive trade wall.

Yet America’s response has been cautious rather than confrontational. This restraint reflects reality. The U.S. needs Canada — for energy security, continental defence, and climate cooperation. Overreaction would risk destabilising one of its most dependable alliances.

Even so, the decision leaves a subtle but unmistakable tension in the air. Ottawa is reminded that stepping out from Washington’s shadow, even carefully, carries real consequences. Every move toward trade diversification has a diplomatic cost, and even small departures from U.S. expectations draw scrutiny. Canada now finds itself on a narrow ledge, trying to reassure its closest ally while holding on to the freedom to act in its own economic interest.

Beyond the boardrooms and policy briefings, the effects are felt most sharply everyday by  Canadians. Through the lens of climate policy, the stakes are high. More affordable EV could accelerate emissions reductions and make clean transportation attainable not just for wealthy urban residents, but for families and communities across Canada.  In this narrow sense, the deal aligns with Canada’s environmental ambitions more convincingly than many domestic subsidies ever have.

But this benefit carries its own contradictions. Cheaper imports may weaken domestic innovation, discouraging investment in Canada’s manufacturing sector. It is a paradox at the heart of the agreement: it advances sustainability while potentially compromising the economic foundations that make that progress possible.

Canada’s relationship with China in recent years has been defined more by tension than by reconciliation. Diplomatic stand-offs, retaliatory trade measures, and deep-seated mistrust have left scars that a single agreement cannot erase. The EV deal does not erase this history; nor does it signal trust. It signals fatigue.

Beijing, for its part, sees opportunity. Re-entering the Canadian market, even in a limited capacity, helps normalise Chinese technology and manufacturing at a time when it faces exclusion elsewhere.

Canada’s decision on electric vehicles reveals a broader reality for middle powers in a world dominated by great-power rivalry. Principles do  matter, but influence also  matters more. Countries , which are  without the economic clout of the United States or China should steer carefully.

The deal is neither a triumph nor a surrender. It is a calculated risk taken in an unforgiving global environment. Whether it pays off will depend on what follows — investment in domestic industry, protection for workers, transparency in implementation, and steady diplomacy with allies.

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Geography has a way of reasserting itself when politics grows careless. Greenland, long treated as a frozen periphery, has returned to the centre of strategic debate not because it has changed, but because the world around it has. Once the concern of military planners alone, the island is now a diplomatic fault line — exposing tensions between power, alliance management, and international norms.

That reality was underlined last week when France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement backing Denmark and Greenland amid renewed pressure from Washington. Such collective clarity is rare in European diplomacy. It reflected a shared concern that Greenland is no longer just an Arctic issue, but a measure of how far strategic necessity can be pursued without eroding the principles that underpin Western security.

Greenland’s importance rests on an old and stubborn fact: maps still matter. Positioned between North America and Europe, it anchors the northern Atlantic space linking the two continents. The Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap has shaped defence planning since the Second World War, when Allied forces recognised its importance for controlling air and maritime access to Europe.

During the Cold War, this corridor was vital for tracking Soviet submarines and bombers. Today, the threats are different but the logic remains. The Arctic is still the shortest route for intercontinental ballistic missiles between Russia and North America. It is also increasingly relevant for space surveillance, satellite tracking, and the protection of undersea cables.

This is why the U.S. military presence at Pituffik Space Base — formerly Thule Air Base — remains central to American defence planning. Its radar and tracking systems feed directly into missile early-warning and space-domain awareness networks. In an era of hypersonic weapons and shrinking decision windows, early detection from the High North is not a relic of the Cold War; it is a core requirement.

Europe’s stake is no less direct. The security of Atlantic sea lanes, digital infrastructure, and NATO reinforcement routes all depend on stability in the northern maritime space. Any serious disruption in the GIUK gap would have immediate consequences for European security.

Greenland’s renewed prominence reflects wider shifts in the Arctic itself. The region is no longer insulated from global competition. Russia has already invested huge in upgrading its Arctic military posture as it has  reopened its  airfields and  expanded its  radar coverage, and also reinforced its Northern Fleet. It has  enhanced the  Moscow’s power into the North Atlantic.

China  has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and  expanded its presence through research, commercial projects, and diplomacy. Its has  interests  in shipping routes, data infrastructure, and long-term access to resources . It’s all are part of a broader effort to reduce strategic points, dominated by others.

For the US, maintaining influence there limits the strategic space available to rivals. President Donald Trump has expressed this sharply and  argued  that without U.S. control, Greenland could fall under Russian or Chinese influence — despite the fact that Washington already operates critical military infrastructure on the island.

Trump’s rhetoric on Greenland fits a broader pattern of assertive U.S. behaviour that often sidelines legal and diplomatic restraint. In recent weeks, Washington has struck Venezuela, abducted President Nicolás Maduro, and issued threats against Iran, Colombia and Mexico. Against this backdrop, talk of “control” over Greenland resonates far beyond the Arctic.

For Europe, the issue cuts deep. Denmark is a NATO ally. Greenland is a self-governing territory with a clear political voice. Suggesting that its future can be dictated by force or pressure challenges the very principles of sovereignty and consent that Western alliances claim to uphold.

This explains the unusually direct European response. The statement by six major European powers was not anti-American, but pro-process. It reaffirmed that security in the Arctic must rest on consultation, legality, and respect for territorial integrity. Greenland’s own leaders have been equally clear: the island is not for sale, and its people alone will decide its future.

The episode exposes a quiet tension within NATO — between the possession of power and the legitimacy of its use.

Despite the drama, U.S. interest in Greenland is not new. It dates back more than 150 years. In 1867, the same year Washington purchased Alaska from Russia, Secretary of State William Seward ordered a detailed survey of Greenland. Fresh from expanding America’s northern frontier, he understood the long-term value of Arctic geography.

That logic persisted. During the Second World War, the United States assumed responsibility for Greenland’s defence with Danish consent. During the Cold War, it embedded military infrastructure that remains operational today. What has changed is not American interest, but the global environment in which it is pursued — one where alliances, law, and public legitimacy matter more than ever.

Greenland’s strategic value extends beyond defence. The island is believed to hold significant deposits of rare earth elements and other critical minerals essential for clean energy technologies, advanced electronics, and modern weapons systems. As the U.S. and Europe seek to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains, Greenland naturally enters strategic calculations.

Warming temperatures are sharpening this interest. Retreating ice is making Arctic waters more navigable and lengthening the window for commercial and military activity. At the same time, it is heightening environmental risks and political sensitivities. Many Greenlanders remain sceptical of large-scale mining and extraction, concerned about irreversible ecological damage and the impact on local communities. Strategies that view Greenland primarily as a storehouse of resources, rather than a lived and governed society, are more likely to generate resistance than stability.

 Greenland is not a vanity project or a colonial leftover. It is a strategic anchor, a surveillance platform, a logistical hub and a denial asset combined. Losing influence there would not cause immediate collapse, but it would signal retreat — the kind rivals notice long before electorates do.

What Greenland requires now is seriousness, not spectacle. That means sustained diplomacy, fair arrangements with Denmark, respect for Greenlandic self-rule, and recognition that security in the Arctic cannot be built through coercion without cost.

Trump’s focus on Greenland reflects a hard strategic truth: the map leaves little room for alternatives. But power exercised without restraint has a habit of undermining the very security it seeks to protect. In the High North, as elsewhere, the strength of the West will be judged not only by where it can reach, but by how wisely it chooses to do so.

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If measured by official language alone, the relationship appears to be in excellent health. Leaders on both sides speak of shared values, strategic trust, and a common vision for the Indo-Pacific. Military exercises continue to grow in scale and sophistication. Cooperation spans defense, technology, space, climate, and education. Few bilateral relationships today are as wide in scope.

Over the past year, tensions over trade, tariffs, and India’s energy choices—particularly its continued engagement with Russia—have strained the tone of the partnership. Sharp rhetoric from Washington and retaliatory frustration in New Delhi have reminded both sides that strategic alignment does not erase national interest. The relationship has not derailed, but it has lost some of its easy momentum.

This moment matters because U.S.–India ties are no longer driven by novelty or symbolism. The “historic breakthrough” phase is over. What remains is the harder work of managing expectations between two countries that are powerful, proud, and unwilling to subordinate their interests to the other.

At the strategic level, the logic of partnership is undeniable. The United States sees India as central to maintaining balance in Asia—too large to ignore, too independent to control, and too important to fail as a partner. In turn India recognizes that the U.S. remains unmatched in technology, capital, and global influence. Their cooperation is not sentimental; it is practical.

One of the persistent misunderstandings in Washington is the assumption that deeper partnership should naturally lead to closer alignment on every major global issue. India has never accepted that premise. It’s foreign policy has always been shaped by a desire to preserve room for maneuver, avoid entanglement, and make decisions case by case. This is not indecision; it is doctrine.

India’s engagement with Russia, most visibly in energy, has become the point where these differences surface most openly.  Washington see it as a contradiction. In New Delhi, it is understood as a necessary choice—rooted in economics, history, and a reluctance to allow outside pressure to define national policy. Neither side is acting irrationally—but they are operating from different assumptions.

Trade has become another fault line.  Even as both governments talk about building closer economic ties, old disagreements over tariffs, trade, and regulations are quietly resurfacing. For Indian businesses, these measures feel at odds with the promises of partnership. From the U.S. perspective, economic pressure has simply become a normal part of diplomacy. But if this gap between words and actions isn’t addressed, it could quietly sow long-term mistrust.

Defense cooperation is still going strong. Today, the two militaries work together more closely than ever before. Intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and coordination on equipment happen quietly and steadily—not through flashy announcements, but through consistent, professional collaboration.. These ties are built quietly—and that is often what makes them durable.

Technology collaboration is following a similar path. Cooperation in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, space research, and advanced manufacturing reflects a shared understanding that future power will be defined less by territory and more by innovation. These are long-term bets, insulated from the daily churn of political disputes.

Perhaps the most underappreciated strength of the relationship lies outside government altogether. The Indian diaspora in the United States—students, scientists, entrepreneurs, doctors—forms a human bridge that no policy disagreement can easily sever. These connections shape perceptions, soften rhetoric, and create incentives for stability on both sides. Governments argue; societies adapt.

In Washington, there is a growing impulse to sort partners into neat categories—aligned or unaligned, cooperative or obstructive. India fits none of these boxes comfortably. In New Delhi, there is rising skepticism about being described as a “key partner” while being subjected to public pressure and economic penalties. These perceptions are important because once trust is lost, it’s hard to get back.

The real danger isn’t a sudden breakup. It’s quieter—a slow shrinking of what the relationship can achieve. A relationship that continues to function, but stops dreaming big. That would be a loss—not just for the two countries involved, but for a global order that increasingly depends on flexible, plural partnerships rather than rigid alliances.

For the United States, the challenge is learning to work with an India that insists on being itself—independent, opinionated, and occasionally inconvenient. For India, the challenge is balancing autonomy with responsibility, ensuring that its insistence on strategic freedom does not slide into strategic ambiguity.

The U.S.–India relationship has reached a stage where success will not be measured by joint statements or summit photos, but by how well both sides manage disagreement without letting it define the partnership.  If they can manage that, the relationship won’t just survive—it could help shape global affairs for years to come.

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Ninety-eight per cent of job postings at Canada’s top universities now require DEI compliance

By Mark Milke

Since the first European university was founded in Bologna, Italy, in 1088, the goal of higher education was supposed to be a search for truth. But too many modern ivory towers in the West, including in Canada in recent decades, have been drawn into trendy anti-reality policies, activism and illiberalism.

A key example is the rise of so-called diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) policies and bureaucracies at universities. Some institutions now select students and professors based on race, ethnicity or gender on the assumption that doing so will somehow make up for discrimination 100 years ago. Others attribute differing economic outcomes between groups almost entirely to systemic racism, ignoring other contributing factors.

Both assumptions are flawed, but they explain why DEI offices have sprung up like toxic weeds over the last 10 years across Canadian and American campuses.

These policies rest on the mistaken premise that group disparities can only be explained by discrimination. In reality, income and wealth in a liberal democracy such as Canada or the United States result from multiple factors: education levels, family dynamics, geography (people in rural areas, including reserves, earn less than those in major cities), the length of time an immigrant has lived in the country, and a variety of other influences.

When these factors are accounted for, more similarities than differences emerge between groups.

For example, there is an average income gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians, but that is partly due to differences in education levels and geography. A greater proportion of Indigenous Canadians live in rural areas or on reserves, where employment opportunities and wages tend to be lower. When these factors are considered, the gap largely disappears. In 2020, Indigenous Canadians with a bachelor’s degree had a median income of $76,000, while non-Indigenous Canadians earned $77,500. Among those with graduate degrees, the trend reversed—Indigenous Canadians earned a median income of $85,000, slightly more than the $83,000 median for non-Indigenous Canadians.

The same holds true for women. The four highest-earning female groups in Canada, based on ancestry, are Korean, Chinese, South Asian and Filipino—reflecting their education levels and hours worked.

Yet despite these economic realities, DEI policies continue to promote a simplistic racism-explains-all ideology. This mindset has now deeply embedded itself in university hiring practices, where race-based selection criteria have become widespread.

A new Aristotle Foundation index analyzed 489 academic job advertisements at Canada’s 10 largest universities, examining their use of DEI criteria in hiring. Of those, 477 postings—98 per cent—used some form of DEI requirement or strategy to fill academic vacancies.

The data was categorized based on how DEI principles were applied, ranging from generic statements to explicit hiring preferences based on race, ethnicity or gender. This analysis allowed for the creation of a University Discrimination Index, offering a clearer picture of how deeply DEI influences hiring decisions.

The findings are striking. Every University of Toronto employment posting and 96 per cent of Dalhousie University’s job listings mentioned or implied that a candidate’s “contribution to DEI” was an asset. McGill University and the University of Saskatchewan required all applicants to complete a DEI survey. Nearly two-thirds of postings at the University of British Columbia and 55 per cent at the University of Manitoba required candidates to submit a DEI statement or essay.

Some might argue that requiring DEI statements does not necessarily mean a university will discriminate in hiring. But that is unlikely, given the vast amount of time, money and advocacy DEI proponents dedicate to promoting race-, ethnic- and gender-based hiring quotas.

Beyond the implicit message of who is likely to be hired, some universities are explicit. The University of New Brunswick barred white males from applying for a research chair position in “quantum sensors for space” in its physics department. At UBC, nearly one in five academic job postings explicitly restricted applications to individuals from a particular race, ethnicity or other immutable trait.

Even without addressing the lack of viewpoint diversity at Canada’s universities, the core problem with diversity, equity and inclusion policies is not the desire for a diverse workforce—diversity is beneficial because talent exists in all groups.

The problem with racial, ethnic and gender hiring quotas is threefold. First, they treat individuals based on group identity rather than individual merit. Second, they assume that identity largely explains success or failure. And third, they undermine merit as a hiring principle.

The result is an anti-individual, anti-meritocratic and illiberal hiring approach at many of Canada’s largest universities.

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Mark Milke is the president of the Aristotle Foundation for Public Policy, which recently released DEI and academic hiring in public universities: An index of university discrimination in Canada.

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The views, opinions and positions expressed by all Troy Media columnists and contributors are the author’s alone. They do not inherently or expressly reflect the views, opinions and/or positions of Troy Media, TV Punjab and Ubiq Broadcasting Corp.

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Ontario is in a debt crisis. Voters must demand fiscal responsibility.

By Jay Goldberg

One billion dollars a month.

That’s how much Ontario taxpayers are spending on interest payments alone.

That money isn’t going to health care, roads or schools. It’s covering debt obligations, a growing cost that Ontarians cannot afford to overlook as they head to the polls.

With a provincial election set for Feb. 27, voters will soon decide who will lead the province and, more importantly, who will manage its finances.

Ontario already has the most indebted subnational government in the world. In the past two decades, it has balanced the budget just twice. During that time, borrowing costs have risen, and the province has taken on more debt. That debt now requires billions in annual interest payments—money that could otherwise fund public services.

Every dollar spent servicing debt is a dollar that isn’t going toward frontline services. The more the province borrows, the greater the long-term strain on essential programs such as health care and infrastructure. The challenge for the next government will be balancing priorities while ensuring Ontario’s finances don’t spiral further out of control.

Successive governments of all political stripes have struggled to rein in spending. As borrowing costs climbed, so did Ontario’s reliance on debt to finance operations. The result is billions in interest payments each year—funds that could otherwise support essential services or tax relief.

Yet election campaigns tend to focus on promises rather than fiscal realities. Over the next few weeks, party leaders will unveil spending plans to win over voters. What’s often missing in these discussions is a clear strategy for funding new commitments without deepening the deficit.

If Ontario is to get its finances under control, two key steps are needed.

First, Ontario’s next government should commit to balancing the budget this spring.

In the fall economic update, the provincial government projected a $1.5-billion deficit for 2025-26, with a return to balance the following year. That deficit could easily be wiped out so long as the government doesn’t dip into its $1.5-billion contingency fund. The fiscal path to balance is there—it just requires discipline.

Ontario has done this before. In the mid-1990s, facing a severe fiscal crisis, the province made tough decisions to rein in spending and restore financial stability. More recently, in the late 2010s, the government brought the province close to balance before the COVID-19 pandemic derailed fiscal plans. While the pandemic necessitated emergency spending, Ontario now needs to return to sustainable budgeting.

Second, every dollar of new spending should be offset with a corresponding reduction elsewhere in the budget.

Ontario’s debt now exceeds $400 billion, far more than Quebec’s, which has a lower debt-to-GDP ratio despite historically running deficits. Even California, a state with a much larger economy, has managed to control its debt burden better than Ontario has over the past decade. If these jurisdictions can take meaningful steps to manage their finances, Ontario should be able to do the same.

Politicians often argue that deficits are necessary to fund critical public services. While that may be true in times of crisis, running long-term deficits without a plan to return to balance puts the province in a precarious position. Interest rates fluctuate, and if borrowing costs rise, Ontario’s ability to fund essential services could be compromised. Responsible budgeting isn’t about austerity. It’s about ensuring future governments can still afford to invest in what matters most.

Households manage their budgets by cutting back in one area to make room for new expenses. The provincial government should do the same. If a political party wants to introduce a new spending program, it should identify where the money will come from—whether through savings, efficiencies or reallocation of existing funds.

This election will decide Ontario’s financial future. Without responsible policies, debt will keep rising—leaving the next generation to pay the price.

Political leaders will be tempted to make ambitious promises in the coming weeks. But beyond the headlines, Ontarians must ask a critical question: How will it be paid for?

Jay Goldberg is the former Ontario Director of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation. Jay is a seasoned public policy professional with a strong academic background and commitment to fostering meaningful governance and public affairs dialogue. With extensive experience in academia and public policy, Goldberg has established himself as a thought leader.

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The views, opinions and positions expressed by all Troy Media columnists and contributors are the author’s alone. They do not inherently or expressly reflect the views, opinions and/or positions of Troy Media, TV Punjab or Ubiq Broadcasting Corp.

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Many job seekers think cover letters are outdated, but recruiters disagree

By Nick Kossovan

Nowadays, landing a job requires doing what others don’t. That’s why the ongoing debate about whether to include a cover letter with an application is perplexing.

As a job seeker, you should want to do everything possible to differentiate yourself from the competition. The common argument against writing a cover letter is that recruiters and hiring managers won’t read it, leading many job seekers to believe it’s not worth the effort.

Nobody knows exactly what percentage of recruiters and hiring managers read cover letters or how much they influence hiring decisions. Most insights on this topic are anecdotal or based on limited survey data.

Some job seekers look for the easiest route—putting in minimal effort. But nothing worth having comes easy. Given today’s competitive job market, it’s essential to increase your chances wherever possible. A cover letter provides a competitive advantage by making it easier for hiring managers to connect your qualifications and experience to the role.

Not including a cover letter is a missed opportunity to:

1. Pitch why you’re the right candidate for the job.
2. Show that you’ve taken the time to understand the role and its requirements. Many job seekers apply indiscriminately, so those who demonstrate they’ve read and understood the posting stand out.
3. Provide additional evidence to support your candidacy.
4. Demonstrate your writing skills.

This isn’t a debate. The level of effort you put in reflects how much you want the job. Sending a cover letter—or a thank-you email (another topic for another day)—demonstrates your seriousness and strengthens your application. No hiring manager rejects a qualified candidate for including a cover letter. However, some hiring managers consider omitting one unprofessional.

Not including a cover letter is lazy. And hiring managers don’t hire lazy.

Recruiters and employers favour applicants with cover letters, if only because it shows passion and investment in the role.

A common question is whether to include your cover letter as an attachment or in the body of an email. I recommend the latter, as it makes an immediate impression when the email is opened. Keep it short (75 to 150 words) and concise. This highlights two essential career skills: written communication and the ability to articulate the tangible value you bring to a company.

Your cover letter has one job: get the recipient to read your resume. With attention spans shrinking, getting to the point is critical. Writing with brevity will serve you well throughout your career. Keep it short and simple.

[Date]
[Recipient’s first name],

I’m writing to apply for the IT Project Manager position advertised on LinkedIn. Having led Global X’s development team (12 IT professionals) for seven years, overseeing key projects from conception to delivery, I am an ideal candidate for this role.

Some of my career highlights:

• Directed a $5.8-million digital transformation project for an air transport company, reducing lost/damaged cargo incidents from five percent to 0.8 per cent.
• Reduced costs for a clothing manufacturer by $2 million by conducting a gap analysis of its supply chain process.
• Implemented a cloud migration strategy for over 200 legacy applications, achieving zero downtime and cutting operational costs by 35 percent.

Call me at (XXX) XXX-XXX to schedule a mutually convenient time to discuss how I can contribute to [Company].

Sincerely,
Name
Attached: Resume

That’s it. No long-winded claims about being a “team player,” “detail-oriented,” or a “fast learner.” Employers hire based on results, not self-assessments. The key is to provide three achievements not found in your resume or LinkedIn profile.

Ask yourself: What results did I achieve in past jobs, projects, or tasks?

If writing a concise cover letter that could improve your chances of landing an interview seems like too much effort, you might need to question how badly you want the job.

Nick Kossovan, a well-seasoned veteran of the corporate landscape, offers advice on searching for a job.

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The views, opinions and positions expressed by all Troy Media columnists and contributors are the author’s alone. They do not inherently or expressly reflect the views, opinions and/or positions of Troy Media, TV Punjab and Ubiq Broadcasting Corp.

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The sewa is being done by a UK-based Sikh organisation after the gold sheets lost their sheen and developed cracks due to passage of enormous time.

It is pertinent to mention here that it would be for the very first time time that the inner gold plating will be repaired, as the outer gold plates had been replaced between 1995 and 1999.

According to the information, l Maharaja Ranjit Singh had got the gold plating done between 1803 and 1830.

SGPC chief Harjinder Singh Dhami said that the repair work shall be done with utmost care to ensure that the originality does not gets tinkered.

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Divulging the details, the DC said that the ECI in its directions has prohibited any kind of victory procession on or after counting adding that strict action would be taken against those found violating these guidelines. He also said that any kind of negligence in this regard would be dealt with strictly. The ECI has also restricted the number of persons to accompany the winning candidates while receiving their certificates as only two persons can accompany the candidate or his/her authorized representative during issuing of certificate of election.

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Ahead of polls, he was addressing the first rally here in Jalandhar.

Targeting the Congress government in Punjab, the Prime Minister said that he wanted to offer prayers at the Devi Talab temple here, but the police and the administration expressed helplessness in making arrangements in this regard.

He claimed that the NDA alliance in Punjab will form the next government, which will usher in a new chapter of development.

“I want to assure the people, especially the youth, of their bright future, we will leave no stone unturned,” he said.

“Congress policies have destroyed businesses in Punjab and affected employment,” Modi said.

Meanwhile, Punjab Lok Congress President Captain Amarinder Singh and Shiromani Akali Dal (United) President Sukhdekh Singh Khalsa were also present at the rally.

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